|Table of Contents|

Two-stage dynamic incentive model of synergy and innovation for logistics alliance(PDF)

《交通运输工程学报》[ISSN:1671-1637/CN:61-1369/U]

Issue:
2013年04期
Page:
94-101
Research Field:
交通运输规划与管理
Publishing date:

Info

Title:
Two-stage dynamic incentive model of synergy and innovation for logistics alliance
Author(s):
TANG Zhi-ying1; 2;  ZHOU De-su2;  YE Huai-zhen1
1. School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, Sichuan, China; 2. School of Management Science, Chengdu University of Technology, Chengdu 610059, Sichuan, China
Keywords:
logistics engineering;  logistics alliance;  synergy and innovation;  income sharing;  incentive coefficient;  effort level;  principal agent
PACS:
U491.12
DOI:
-
Abstract:
In order to improve the synergy level and income status of logistics alliance, the income of third party logistics(TPL)was taken as objective function, the incentive compatibility constraint and retained income of member were taken as constraint conditions, and the two-stage dynamic incentive model of synergy and innovation for logistics alliance was established. With the change of substitutable degree for the two tasks such as synergy and innovation, the optimal incentive coefficient and the optimal effort level were calculated, and the fixed incomes of member and the incomes of TPL under the single-stage static incentive and the two-stage dynamic incentive were compared. Analysis result shows that when the retained income of member is 0.6 million yuan and substitutable degree are 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 respectively, the fixed incomes of member are -1.087 7, -1.095 3, -1.084 8, -1.063 0, -1.033 4, -0.999 3 million yuan respectively under the single-stage static incentive and are -1.236 7, -1.106 5, -0.995 1, -0.898 3, -0.816 2, -0.744 7 million yuan under the two-stage dynamic incentive. The incomes of TPL are 1.092 2, 1.100 9, 1.091 1, 1.069 5, 1.039 5, 1.003 2 million yuan respectively under the single-stage static incentive and are 1.245 4, 1.117 2, 1.007 3, 0.911 8, 0.828 1, 0.753 0 million yuan respectively under the two-stage dynamic incentive, the incomes of TPL increase 14.03%, 1.48%, -7.68%, -14.75%, -20.34%, -24.94% respectively. The fixed income of member, the optimal incentive coefficient and the optimal effort level increase with the increase of substitutable degree. When substitutable degree is 0.2, the income of TPL is maximum, and the scheme is optimal. 3 tabs, 3 figs, 22 refs.

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Last Update: 2013-08-30