|Table of Contents|

Slot switching model of airlines under cooperative game(PDF)

《交通运输工程学报》[ISSN:1671-1637/CN:61-1369/U]

Issue:
2012年05期
Page:
85-90
Research Field:
交通运输规划与管理
Publishing date:

Info

Title:
Slot switching model of airlines under cooperative game
Author(s):
YAN Jun1; 2;  WU Tong-shui1; 3;  GAO Qiang1;  ZHU Jin-fu1
1. School of Civil Aviation, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, Jiangsu, China; 2. China Academy of Civil Aviation Science and Technology, Beijing 100028, China; 3. School of Economic and Management, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin 300300, China
Keywords:
air transportation;  slot allocation;  slot switching;  collaborative decision-making;  flight bank;  cooperative game;  Pareto improved solution
PACS:
F560.6
DOI:
-
Abstract:
Aiming at the ground holding problem under the operation mode of flight bank, slot switching strategy was proposed. The minimum passenger delays of all airlines involved in slot switching were taken as objective functions, the Pareto improved solution was taken as constraint condition, and the slot switching model between two airlines was established by using cooperative game theory. The model was decomposed into slot assignment model and slot combination model. By using slot assignment model, the optimal assignment scheme and objective function value under determined slot condition were obtained. By using slot combination model, the optimal slot allocation schemes of two airlines were obtained. Computation result shows that without slot switching, the total passenger delays of airlines 1 and 2 are 238 955, 145 170 min respectively. After switching six slots between two airlines, the total passenger delays of airlines 1 and 2 are 232 945, 142 130 min respectively, and reduce by 2.5% and 2.1% respectively. When flight information is complete, slot switching can make airlines get optimal Pareto improved solutions. When flight information is imcomplete, airlines can obtain better slot switching schemes by using bargaining method. 9 tabs, 1 fig, 19 refs.

References:

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Last Update: 2012-11-05